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BTTR's first encounter with Cuban MiGs
triggers a response from U.S. Air Force
interceptors and a protocol for BTTR
flights (followed on Feb. 24, 1996)
intended for its operational safety. The
procedures to be followed include: 1)
The filing of a flight plan which is
provided in advance to the Cubans; 2) a
unique transponder code to clearly
identify each BTTR aircraft; 3) radio
communication with Cuba's air traffic
controllers prior to crossing parallel
24 south. This procedure is still
followed and this information is still
routinely given to the Cuban authorities
by the FAA before every BTTR search and
rescue mission.
References:
U.S. Coast Guard report of first
encounter. Witness on incident and
protocol, Mary Ann Zduncyzk, former
supervisor for the FAA flight service in
Miami, spoke with the Miami Herald.
See Tropic Magazine, Feb. 16,1997, pg.
13.
12/19/92
BTTR is warned via radio by the FAA of
impending danger and requested to land.
BTTR was later advised that MiGs were in
its search area.
Witnesses available on request.
1995
The U.S. military takes a "un-official"
but important role in secret talks with
Cuban Military officials, at Guantanamo,
Cuba. A video tape of the "friendly"
talks at the Guantanamo Naval Base is
leaked to the press and reported in
Miami
BTTR organize and participate in several
seminars on the subject of nonviolence
as a tool for change in Cuba, with the
Albert Einstein Institution, The Florida
Martin Luther King Jr. Institute for
nonviolence and with Ricardo Antocich
S.J. a Roman Catholic priest and a
scholar on the subject.
These activities were made public.
The Miami Times Feb. 8,1996 pg. 4A,
"Spreading King's Message"
07/13/95
BTTR participates in a flotilla, to
remember and honor the 41 men, women and
children killed on that date the
previous year, after the sinking, by the
Cuban Navy, of the "13 de Marzo" tug
boat. BTTR aircraft flies over Havana to
divert the attention of the Cuban
command plane away from the boats of the
flotilla, when these were being rammed
by Cuba's gunboats. The command plane
followed one of the BTTR aircraft.
The Miami Herald July 15, 1995 article
"Thirteen Minutes Over Havana"
Later in 1995
BTTR makes a commitment to provide
relief supplies to the refugee camp in
the Bahamas on a weekly basis, typically
on Saturdays, and regularly did so.
Several organizations including the Red
Cross and The Salvation Army
participate. Witnesses
available.
01/09/96 & 01/13/96
Operation "Martin Luther King Jr.".
BTTR drops leaflets containing the U.N.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
over Havana, from international air
space, taking advantage of
meteorological conditions and altitude.
Reference:
BTTR press release Jan. 19, 1996 and
Miami Herald Jan. 15,1996 "A Political
Deluge"
01/??/96
U.S. Intelligence detects Cuban MiGs
practicing air to air missile firing
against slow moving aircraft similar to
BTTR's.
Time Magazine article dated Oct. 28,
1996 page 46. "Clinton's Cuban Road to
Florida"
02/12/96
Retired Admiral Eugene Carroll of the
Center for Defense Information, reported
to the State Department and the Defense
Intelligence Agency that during his
visit to Cuba the Cuban authorities had
asked him and others in his group how
the U. S. government would react if Cuba
shot down exile planes that violated
Cuban air space. Carroll informed the
U.S. that he took the question as an
indication that Cuban military officials
were considering such an action.
See CNN transcript of news show 9:25 am
ET Feb. 25,1996
2/13/96
BTTR pledges its support to "Concilio
Cubano" and publicly provides an
undisclosed donation of funds. Despite
acting in accordance with "open"
U.S. policy to Cuba, BTTR is not granted
a license to assist Concilio Cubano, and
is privately criticized by U.S.
authorities for acting on its own.
See Miami Herald Feb. 14,1996 pg. 2B
"Brothers gives .... " and
El Nuevo Herald, Feb. 4,1996 pg. 3A "Nuccio
defiende ..."
02/17/96
The U.S. State Department advises
various governmental agencies that BTTR
may be planning a political statement on
02/24/96, thus creating a dangerous
perception of BTTR's intentions. This
information was fabricated and probably
initiated at the F.B.I. by Cuba's double
agent and occasional BTTR pilot Juan
Pablo Roque, who later returned to Cuba
on 2/23/96 (one day before the shoot
down).
See Testimony of Customs radar expert
Jeffrey Houlihan at the court hearing of
the FAA vs. Jose Basulto. (Mr.
Houlihan was a witness for the U.S.
Government, not Mr.Basulto.)
Court transcript pg. 361, 362, 364.
and
Sun Sentinel Feb. 29,1996 "'FBI admits
... "
2/18/96
MiGs practice the shoot-down of a slow
flying small aircraft, according to
testimony from participant obtained in
Tampa.
Miami Herald article dated Aug.7, 1997.
02/??/96
Jeane Kirkpatrik, Reagan's former
U.N. Ambassador, informed The Miami
Herald that a Clinton administration
official, knowledgeable about Cuban
affairs, had spoken with her, about his
own concern and loss of sleep over his
conviction that something dreadful was
going to happen to the Brothers planes
and volunteers.
See The Miami Herald's Tropic magazine
Feb., 16, 1997 pg. 11.
02/23/96
Richard Nuccio, White House expert on
Cuban affairs, told Chris Marquis, of
the Miami Herald Washington Bureau, that
Brothers to the Rescue were headed for a
clash with Cuban authorities the next
day.
Tropic Magazine Feb., 16, 1997 pg. 12.
The International Civil Aviation
Organization ("ICAO") report states that
the State Department believed the Cubans
to be in a "rough mood" that week.
( ICAO report pg. 50 paragraph 2.2.2).
It is interesting to note that given
all of this information the U.S. State
Department did not warn BTTR.
11:00 am
BTTR made its weekly plan to fly to the
Bahamas and invited various non-BTTR
members to participate as observers.
4:00 pm
The Bahamian government notifies BTTR
that it is denied entry into the refugee
camp due to a visiting delegation from
Cuba. As a result, BTTR plans a standard
search and rescue mission in the Florida
Straits, responding to the news of new
departures from the Island as it had
done in 1800+ missions 'in the past.
THE FOLLOWING EVENTS OCCURRED ON
FEBRUARY 24,1996
12:15 to
12:40 P.M
Cuban MiGs are sighted in the area north
of Havana by U.S. radar.
(See ICAO Report pg. 51, paragraph
2.3.1.2) BTTR later learned from
Maj. Houlihan and others that U.S.
interceptors responded to their
presence.
1:15 P.M.
Three BTTR aircraft depart for regular
humanitarian search and rescue mission.
Four U.S. radar facilities activate
surveillance of BTTR aircraft.
(See ICAO report pg. 51, paragraph
2.3.3.1.1)
Approx.
2:50 P.M.
BTTR planes see a U. S. military
intelligence, Orion type aircraft,
headed East, at the same altitude,
approximately five miles north of the 24
parallel. An unusual sighting.
2:57 P.M.
BTTR contacts Havana Center to report
their crossing of the 24th Parallel
Southbound, as done on all search and
rescue missions since 07/21/91.
(ICAO report transcript pg. 22 through
32.)
3:00 P.M.
Two Cuban MiGs take off to intercept the
BTTR aircraft.
(U.S. Air Force screen-print marked "1")
Shortly thereafter, U.S.
interceptor jets at Homestead Air Force
Base were placed on "battlestations"
alert. The Homestead F-15s were then
directed off of battlestations by
Cheyenne Mountain. This has been
characterized as due to a
"communications error".
3:10 P.M.
Cuban MiGs fly above BTTR aircraft
(U.S. Air Force screen-print marked "2")
3:15 P.M.
Major Jeffrey Houlihan of the U.S.
Customs Radar Surveillance out of March
Air Force Base in California identifies
the Cuban MiGs flying towards the United
States and maneuvering around the BTTR
aircraft. He proceeds to make the
equivalent of a "911" call to the
Southeast Air Defense Sector at Tyndall
Air Force Base. Tyndall Air Force Base
confirms Major Houlihan's sighting and
states, "we're handling it, don't
worry".
The Miami Herald, "U.S. Radar Official:
911 call", dated July 3, 1996.
Major Houlihan further testified
that there is a standard operating
procedure in which interceptor jets must
be deployed once Cuban MiGs cross the
Cuban 12 mile territorial limit, yet
this procedure was not followed in this
case.
Houlihan court testimony pg. 482.
Miami Air Traffic Control Center could
also have been contacted in a matter of
seconds to warn the BTTR aircraft as has
been done in the past or BTTR's Opalocka
base control could have been contacted
directly in under 2 minutes, as has also
been done in the past.
The Miami Herald article dated July 3,
1996
Houlihan's testimony during the FAA vs.
Basulto court hearing, pg.430.
3:21 P.M.
MiG shoots down first BTTR aircraft,
after visually confirming and describing
target identity (as a blue and white
Cessna 3 3 7) to Cuban military
controllers. This occurred 6 to 7
minutes after Major Houlihan's "911"
call to SEADS.
Transcript of MiGs communications
Exhibit G-1, pg. 4.
3:28 P.M.
MiG shoots down second BTTR aircraft
after visually confirming and describing
the target identity to Cuban military
controllers. This occurred 6 to 7
minutes: after the first BTTR aircraft
had been shot down and 14 minutes after
Major
Houlihan's "911 " call.
MiGs transcript of communications,
Exhibit G-1 pg. 5.
It is alarming that no attempt was made
to warn the BTTR aircraft. On numerous
occasions in the past, the BTTR aircraft
had been contacted, while in flight.
concerning Cuban MiGs 'in the vicinity
or requesting other information. On all
occasions, when advised of Cuban MiGs,
BTTR has returned to their base.
Witnesses on request.
3:35 P.M.
First pair of Cuban MiGs return to Cuban
bases.
3:35 P.M.
Second pair of MiGs pursue third and
last remaining BTTR aircraft on a
Northbound course, guided by military
ground radar control.
3:41 P.M.
Remaining BTTR aircraft crosses 24th
parallel, Northbound.
U.S. radar data.
3:45 P.M.
MiGs make visual contact with the
remaining BTTR aircraft and communicate
with ground control for instruction.
They are 'instructed to continue
pursuit.
MiG's communications transcript, ICAO
Report, Exhibit G-2 pg. 10, 11 and 12.
3:47 P.M.
MiGs positively identifies, to Cuban
controllers, the third remaining BTTR
aircraft as a light blue Cessna 337.
MiGs maneuver about and around the third
BTTR aircraft losing contact two times.
ICAO Report, Exhibit G-2 pg. 10, 11 and
12.
3:49 P.M.
BTTR aircraft at 24:16': 18", placing it
at about 16 miles North of the 24th
parallel
U.S. Air Force screen prints.
3:53 P.M.
The third BTTR aircraft is at 24 - 26'
NORTH and 082 - 27' WEST. About 26 miles
North above the 24th Parallel in U. S.
controlled airspace. The Cuban Migs,
after regaining visual contact of the
BTTR aircraft for the third time, are
told to suspend its mission by ground
control, because it was too high.
Meaning too far to the North?. At this
point. the Cuban MiG was three minutes
from U.S. shores.
See MiG's Communications transcript
Exhibit G-2 pg. 13 for event time,
and
U.S. radar data from radar site B94, for
location.
3:14 P.M. to 3:53 P.M.
During a total of 39 minutes, while the
Cuban MiGs pursued the BTTR aircraft,
the United States made no attempt to
contact the BTTR aircraft, as had been
done on numerous occasions in the past.
A call would have taken less than a
minute. The U.S. Air Force did not
authorize two F-15 interceptor jets to
take off when they were already in
battle stations with engines running to
deter the Cuban MiGs' attack.
Miami Herald's Tropic Feb. 16, 1997
pg.14. |
